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Abstract
The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) proposes a data access policy model—“registered access”—to
increase and improve access to data requiring an agreement to basic terms and conditions, such as the use of DNA sequence
and health data in research. A registered access policy would enable a range of categories of users to gain access, starting
with researchers and clinical care professionals. It would also facilitate general use and reuse of data but within the bounds of
consent restrictions and other ethical obligations. In piloting registered access with the Scientiﬁc Demonstration data sharing
projects of GA4GH, we provide additional ethics, policy and technical guidance to facilitate the implementation of this
access model in an international setting.
Introduction
As data sharing policies in genomics strive to keep pace
with the state of data-intensive science [1, 2], current poli-
cies offer little choice for sharing genomic research data
beyond the two established mechanisms of open access,
when data are freely published on the World Wide Web,
and controlled access (also called managed or restricted
access), whereby qualiﬁed researchers apply for access
on a project-by-project basis and their research plans are
reviewed, often by a committee [3–5]. Both open and
controlled access policy models have historically served the
research community’s needs, scientiﬁc progress and clinical
care. However, plans for greater integration of datasets and
informatics platforms [6], along with ever greater sharing of
health-related datasets and growing interest by clinicians
and patients in also accessing genomic data, call for new
streamlined models of data access that take greater
advantage of the richer access-control policies current
technology is capable of enforcing. Access-control policies,
and the technology that enforces them, must enable rapid
and efﬁcient access to data that is shared only for speciﬁc
purposes to a wide range of users while effectively mana-
ging ethical and legal risks.
The registered access policy model
Our proposals arise from discussions with a range of stake-
holders engaging in international data sharing initiatives as
members of the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health
(GA4GH) [7]. GA4GH is an international coalition dedicated
to improving human health by maximizing the potential of
genomic medicine through effective and responsible data
sharing, as founded on the Framework for Responsible
Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data [8]. Our work
has led us to conclude that there are speciﬁc datasets where
existing consent agreements and ethical approval are com-
patible with a novel data access policy model called regis-
tered access [9]. This model would capitalize on the well-
established role-based access control (RBAC) model for
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information technology security enforcement [10–14] and is
based on the notion that potential users could be granted
online access to data according to their roles (e.g., bona ﬁde
researcher or clinical care professional) and risk analysis,
rather than on the basis of a speciﬁcally described project as is
normally required in the controlled access models commonly
implemented for research purposes. RBAC is widely imple-
mented in government and industry throughout the world
[15]. By capitalizing on RBAC-based access-control tech-
nologies, registered access could, in theory, provide access to
all data shared in this way, following a uniﬁed general
registration process and without the need for individualized
data access committee review.
Examples of registered access
Registration as a means to limit access to data to approved
users—albeit with different approval processes—has already
been used in several genomics projects. For example, the
Wellcome Trust Case-Control Consortium required regis-
tration for access to summary allele frequency datasets once
it was demonstrated that these data could potentially lead to
the re-identiﬁcation of study participants [16, 17]. While this
risk was considered to be low, limiting access to consortium
researchers seemed to be a reasonable mitigation strategy at
the time and was judged by the Consortium Data Access
Committee to be consistent with the participant consent
agreements. More recently, the “Bravo” project requires a
simple form of registration via logging in to access data.
Recent policy recommendations based on risk assessment
for such data aim to discriminate between a lower and higher
risk of potential resulting harm in the case of re-identiﬁca-
tion, for example, limiting access to aggregate data accord-
ing to whether data were associated with more sensitive
health or demographic information (e.g., ethnicity informa-
tion about small or vulnerable populations) [18, 19].
Another current example of a registration-based data
access policy is the DatabasE of genomiC varIation and
Phenotype in Humans using Ensembl Resources (DECI-
PHER [20]). Users who have been approved by the project
coordinator (a senior physician working at the center
depositing the data) are granted registered access to that
project data. DECIPHER projects can be linked to form a
consortium, allowing intra-consortium sharing. Phenome-
Central is another example of a registered access policy for
the identiﬁcation of additional cases for ultra-rare disorders
[21]. Along with DECIPHER, PhenomeCentral is part
of the GA4GH Matchmaker Exchange (MME) initiative.
PhenomeCentral users are required to be bona ﬁde
researchers or clinicians. This is validated through institu-
tional email addresses, as well as through user-provided and
publicly available information such as prior publications,
scientiﬁc activity at conferences identiﬁed through web
searches, and mention on institutional websites. Users
without a scientiﬁc track record (e.g., trainees) can be
validated by a more senior colleague. Data entered into
PhenomeCentral can then be shared either with chosen
researchers or with pre-deﬁned groups (consortia) who have
leads responsible for approving membership.
In addition to these intra-consortia, coordinator-approved
registration policies, several other current projects are pro-
viding, or plan to provide, registration-based access to the
research community beyond their projects (see Box 1).
These resources either grant an account following a review
of an applicant’s credentials (based on submitted or public
information) or following a simple registration of their
identity. All involve online agreement to data use terms and
conditions. CAGI, the Critical Assessment of Genome
Interpretation, active since 2010, has several tiers of access
according to the sensitivity of datasets [22], which are
available to registered users ranging from unafﬁliated
researchers to trainees entering the ﬁeld and individuals at
companies to well-identiﬁed accomplished researchers.
Vouching (e.g., of a mentor for a student) can also allow
appropriate escalation of access.
Implementation in GA4GH
Our model of registered access in the GA4GH context
comprises a three-stage “Triple-A registration” process
(Authentication, Attestation, and Authorization [9]), which
aims to ensure both user identiﬁcation and agreement to a
standard set of general responsibilities while considerably
simplifying the data access application process. Through the
identiﬁcation and authentication process, the individual
provides “proof” that an asserted identity is their own. The
attestation process establishes that the potential data user
meets the requirements expected by the consent agreements
and ethical approval of datasets in question and includes
agreement to comply with the terms of data use required of
registered users. Finally, authorization is the overall process
by which users are granted access to data and permission
to perform speciﬁc actions. We provide concrete examples
of, and guidance for, each stage in the process based on three
GA4GH Demonstration Projects with which we ﬂeshed out
standards that would be broadly applicable.
The Beacon Project (manuscript in press), the Match-
maker Exchange [23], and the BRCA Challenge (manu-
script submitted) are among the initial demonstration
projects that aimed to drive learning, identify requirements,
assess value, and coordinate activity within the ﬁrst phase
of GA4GH. For each of these, we explored options for
using registered access to improve and streamline access
to data that had previously been available either through a
controlled access application process and/or bound by
protocol-speciﬁc restrictions.
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For the Beacon Project, which enables the discovery of
genetic variants across multiple world-wide datasets,
registered access is envisaged as a means to share more
details than simple existence of genetic variants (e.g., that
they are present in individuals with a speciﬁc health con-
dition). In conjunction with Beacon partners ELIXIR
(Europe’s infrastructure for life science information) and
NCBI (the US National Center for Biotechnology Infor-
mation), registered access is being developed for access to
appropriate metadata from controlled access datasets. Such
metadata access is similar to current access protocols at
dbGaP [25] and the European Genome-phenome Archive
(EGA) [26]. Speciﬁcally, users with an eRA account (for
the NIH Commons research grant system) are dbGaP
registered users with access to some information about
available controlled access datasets [24]. Similarly, EGA
users who have obtained access to at least one EGA con-
trolled access dataset have access to speciﬁc EGA infor-
mation about available controlled access datasets after
logging in with their EGA account.
The MME is a federated network connecting databases
of genomic and phenotypic data using a common appli-
cation programming interface to facilitate rare disease
gene discovery, including from DECIPHER (open sub-
set), the PhenomeCentral platform [21], GeneMatcher
[27], MyGene2 [28], Patient Archive (patientarchive.
org), and matchbox. In its current iteration, it requires
two-sided inquiry (i.e., a search from two parties with a
similar patient) and, in this way, connects two investiga-
tors looking for a match for the same candidate gene and
disease. Each user must be registered in one of the data-
bases in order for data to be deposited and queries made.
Future iterations of MME will expand functionality and
facilitate a one-sided inquiry, with bona ﬁde investigators
identiﬁed by a registered access process able to see details
of a matched case, including variants in a speciﬁc gene
and high-level phenotypic information for their purposes
as a scientiﬁc investigator working to understand the
causes of rare diseases.
The goal of the BRCA Challenge is to translate the rapid
expansion of sequencing capacity into useful knowledge
and, in particular, learn how to rapidly interpret variant
data to generate clinical utility. Its intent is to provide
an umbrella under which many groups can collaborate
and bring together data to improve the precision of asses-
sing variants across both BRCA1 and BRCA2. While
its main resource on BRCA variant interpretation is publicly
available, overlaying registered access would allow
enrichment of the dataset with data that cannot be shared
openly: for example, patient data supporting clinical inter-
pretations of variants may not be consented for open release
but would be available to expert review teams, researchers,
or clinicians.
To support these pilot implementations of registered
access in GA4GH, we expand on our initial ethical–legal
feasibility study and review of projects that are pioneering
registration-based access policy (see Box 1) to describe
plans for an international, uniﬁed approach that could
lead to a standardized registration process allowing for
access to a wide range of data resources. All three stages
of registered access (authentication, attestation, and
authorization) pose signiﬁcant ethical–legal and technical
challenges, which we attempt to address by providing pol-
icy and technical guidance.
Authentication
A potential advantage of the registered access policy model
is to efﬁciently provide data access to a relatively large
Box 1 Examples of current projects enabling registration-based access
Resource Access requirements
Critical Assessment of Genome Interpretation (CAGI)
https://genomeinterpretation.org
•Review of users
•Digital signing of data use agreement
Simons Foundation Autism Research Initiative (SFARI)
https://www.nextcode.com/ssc/
•Review of users
•Online agreement to data use conditions
mPower Public Researcher Portal [39]
http://sagebase.org/research-projects/mpower-researcher-portal/
•Veriﬁcation of user identity and training
•Online agreement to data use conditions
AACR Project GENIE
https://www.synapse.org/#!Synapse:syn7222066/wiki/410922
•Veriﬁcation of user identity and training
•Online agreement to data use conditions
Bravo (http://bravo.sph.umich.edu) • Login with ID provider (Google ID)
linked to work email address
•Online agreement to data use conditions
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number of authorised individuals and alleviate the con-
siderable administrative burden on data custodians of
managing controlled access requests. This model is pre-
mised on the trust that broad categories of registered
users, such as researchers and clinical care professionals,
will use the data accessed with the same appropriate
care as they would manage controlled access data. Deﬁning
categories of users as bona ﬁde researchers or clinical
care professionals in this context rests largely on the
information provided at the time of registration (user attri-
butes) and the attestation they agree to. The attributes
requested from users for the registration process, and
particularly their veriﬁcation, will have important implica-
tions for access to data protected by registered access
authorization methods.
Based on an ethical–legal analysis of research ethics
and other legal and administrative frameworks applicable
to data sharing and access, it was previously proposed
that several elements of controlled access review should
be retained in registered access, including for how
users might be authorized based on their “competence.”
We considered whether it might be necessary to set a
few differing levels of stringency for the registered
access model (e.g., Registered, Registered+) to cater
to different projects’ views of the requisite access and
data sensitivity. However, we agreed that a minimal
standard (basic registration criteria) could be established,
thereby enabling mutual recognition between registration
systems established in different parts of the world (e.g.,
ELIXIR and NCBI). This does not preclude policies
that provide different levels of access to data to different
categories of users. Indeed, such policies are enforceable
using a combination of RBAC and attribute-based
access control.
To qualify as either a bona ﬁde researcher or clinical care
professional, ﬁrst of all, individuals will need to provide
the following details of their identity and research/clinical
activity: name; title; position; afﬁliation; and institutional
email address, phone number, website, and mailing address.
As these details may also be provided by an individual’s
organization, they are an important means of strengthening
accountability and traceability of registered users and can
be simply veriﬁed by web searches or calls to institutional
switchboards.
We considered additional information that could
demonstrate a research user’s professional status such as:
researcher identity systems (e.g., ORCID or ISNI); PubMed
publication IDs; and researcher accounts such as those with
funding agencies (e.g., NIH Commons’ eRA), universities
(email addresses or user accounts), and the major public
archives (e.g., MyNCBI and PubMed Commons). Evidence
of academic publication (in the context of a research
position) is typically relied upon in the controlled access
application process as an indication of researchers’ ability to
use data [29]. However, concern was expressed regarding
the value of journal publications and some researcher IDs as
an indicator of professional activity, especially current
activity. There was also concern about the rise in so-called
“predatory” academic journals, leading to publications of
dubious quality [30].
We eventually decided on a “layered” registration
system whereby bona ﬁde researchers or clinical care
professionals could either demonstrate their status directly
(by providing evidence of professional status, such as
license numbers for clinical care professionals) or alter-
natively have their status “vouched for” by another
registered user within their category (for researchers) or
their employing institution (for researchers and clinical
care professionals) (see Box 2). One use case for such a
voucher approach would be for students or trainees who
may have neither professional appointment nor publica-
tions, where the expectation would be for an advisor
to support the registration.
Responsibilities of institutions
Accountability of registered users is central to the registered
access model. Within data access policy models, various
approaches have been proposed to hold users accountable.
One is co-signing of a data access agreement by the (home)
Box 2 The “layered” registration system. Shows the main routes to user authentication for the categories of bona ﬁde researcher and clinical
care professional
A person may receive bona ﬁde researcher status if:
1. Their home institution conﬁrms they are researchers, OR
2. A person who satisﬁes condition (1) corroborates (“vouches for”) their researcher status (as a reference)
A person may receive clinical care professional status if:
1. Their home institution conﬁrms they are clinical care professionals, OR
2. They have a physician or other clinical care professional license (ID/permit number)
1724 S. O. M. Dyke et al.
institution of the users and recognizing this institution as the
ultimate responsible entity. Within this perspective, that
institution can be legally held accountable if the researcher
or clinician commits any wrongdoing. Although registered
access does not require signing such an agreement between
the home institution and the data custodians, one could
argue that, if any wrongdoing happens, the users’ institution
will in all likelihood be contacted and asked to enforce
administrative disciplinary measures in an analogous way as
is currently done in some cases of scientiﬁc misconduct,
such as plagiarism or publishing falsiﬁed data. In turn, in
addition to the attestation registered users will have agreed
to in registering for access to data, home institutions may
require researchers and clinicians—who plan to use internal
or external health data—to sign up to procedures and gui-
dance documents such as a “Code of Conduct”, in order to
bind them with the institutional rules and sanctions in this
respect.
Vouching
For the second route to registration for bona ﬁde researchers,
a person who has already been registered via their institution
could corroborate another researcher’s status, as a reference.
The vouching researcher would need to conﬁrm that they
know and have identiﬁed the researcher they are registering.
To promote accountability and community control, regis-
tered users would be able to see who has vouched for whom.
This is akin to having a witness to one’s competence and
professional activity. The issue here is one of validation
based solely on a personal statement and of potential liability
for the researcher registering this way as they may not have
institutional backup. “Vouchers” could also potentially be
held liable. It is worth noting that a large-scale, successful
community, the Debian community, maintains operating
system software using a vouching approach based on Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) key signing. A member of the com-
munity must have their PGP public key signed by at least
one existing member of the community before their key can
be admitted into the Debian keyring (which then enables
them to modify and upload software, participate in elections,
etc.). There are strict guidelines on the level of proof
required for signature—meeting in person, both parties
show government photo ID, etc. There are also other similar
prerequisites, such as accepting the social contract and
advocation by another member, and violations result in
removal of access by the community.
By providing several routes to registration, we hope to
enable access to as wide a group of potential data users as
possible while maintaining a strong level of accountability.
For clinical care professionals in the USA, the National
Provider Identiﬁer issued by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services could be requested in addition to the
registered user’s license number. As examples, in the UK,
users could provide their General Medical Council licence
number; in Germany, their Lebenslange Arztnummer; in
France, their numéro RPPS (répertoire partagé des pro-
fessionnels de santé); in Australia, their Australian Health
Practitioner Regulation Agency registration number; and in
Canada, their Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons
identiﬁcation number. Registration for clinical care profes-
sionals will in most cases be linked to professional over-
sight and disciplinary governance frameworks.
In case these routes did not allow registration of atypical
potential users, as an additional route to registration, any
individual would also be able to apply to a standard Data
Access Committee (DAC), the committees that oversee
access to controlled access data, to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis for registered access status. DACs may also
help register users whose organizations have yet to establish
the organizational or technical protocols to facilitate regis-
tration (see discussion under “Accessibility” below).
Attestation
Integral to the deﬁnitions of bona ﬁde researcher and clin-
ical care professional are the statements and agreements
included in the attestation stage of the registration process
(see Fig. 1). Indeed, controlling the purpose of data use is
a key component of data protection principles and the
European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [31].
One of the attestation statements refers to respecting
consent-based data use permissions and restrictions, which
should ideally be expressed as Consent Codes [32]. The
GA4GH Consent Codes are a structured way of recording
consent permissions so they can be made clear to users and
to enable maximum data aggregation (with the same or
broader permissions). Another attestation statement prohi-
bits any attempt to identify individuals based on combining
shared data with other public or non-public data sources. It
allows for exceptions to this condition in some circum-
stances, with “prior written permission of the provider’s
sponsoring institution.” This is to enable the recontact of
participants if warranted (e.g., for the return of individual
research results) or for permission to conduct research into
privacy risks. We plan to provide general guidance for the
attestation statement about keeping data secure, such as that
the data should be kept encrypted at rest and in transit
between systems, and that only authorized individuals have
access to the keys (http://genomicsandhealth.org/work-
products-demonstration-projects/security-infrastructure).
We also plan to include an educational module as part of the
registration process. Ultimately, we aim to enable a single
format for the registration process but support a model that
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would allow for additional attestation statements attaching
extra conditions of use for some datasets or for data
from some providers. For example, Australian Genomics
is considering the model that researchers need to supply
proof of Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC)
approval (HREC number, title, etc.), which can then be
easily veriﬁed by web search.
In agreeing on these deﬁnitions of bona ﬁde researcher/
clinical care professional and level of security, cross-
federation becomes possible (e.g., to enable European bona
ﬁde researchers to present queries to US Beacons at the
registered access level and vice versa). The current attri-
butes chosen to deﬁne registered users in these categories
are designed to cover most of the use cases. When excep-
tions arise, there would have to be a very strong need for the
new deﬁnition to make everyone deploy it (and populate
values to the existing users retrospectively). Importantly,
such exceptions would only be considered valid if driven
by informed consent requirements or national laws.
Although our model does not include a review and
approval of the user’s speciﬁc research or data use plans,
we considered requesting abstracts of general planned data
use in lay terms that would be published to enhance trans-
parency. This may be reconsidered, especially to reinforce
registered users’ commitments to using data for appropriate
research or clinical care purposes and to further the
aims of public transparency. Another interesting suggestion
regarding transparency was to request and publish links
to public researcher proﬁles for all registered researchers.
Authorization
In agreeing on the proposed routes to registration, we have
effectively delegated the authorization of registered users
for the two categories described here to established pro-
fessional employment, accreditation, or accomplishment.
The data sharing environment is therefore assumed from
individuals’ bona ﬁdes (including work practices and the
security aspect) along with the basic set of requirements
set out in the registration attestation. Along with efforts
to automate registered access, this potentially limits the
amount of manual authorization that will be required.
Our pilot implementation of the ﬁrst registration route
for academic researchers (their home institution conﬁrms
they are researchers) is the simplest in terms of liability
for the category of “bona ﬁde researchers,” and therefore
the “safest” place to start. ELIXIR is piloting an approach
Fig. 1 The registered access policy model. The ﬁgure shows the
authentication and attestation requirements of the GA4GH registered
access policy model for the user categories of bona ﬁde researcher and
clinical care professional. The seven statements shown in quotation
marks form the attestation stage of the process
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where an ELIXIR user authenticates their identity through
their own research organization’s account, and the organi-
zation conﬁrms researcher's status. Organizational valida-
tion is assumed to improve the provenance of the
researcher’s professional status because home organizations
are vetted by funders, are expected to know their
researchers, and can also provide the authentication
credentials securely to their researchers. A challenge will
be to deﬁne the requirements an organization needs to
meet to become trusted in a global GA4GH registered
access system (e.g., for federated identity in research, the
UK has minimal checks https://www.ukfederation.org.uk/
content/Documents/EligibleOrganisations).
Our experience is that this is often a more controversial
and difﬁcult challenge than the veriﬁcation of individuals’
identity and role. For instance, institutions that might
oversee clinicians and researchers wanting access to
genetic data could include a range of clinical genetics
centers (publicly funded/charitable/private); primary care
centers, which treat certain inherited conditions and other
contexts in which genetic testing may be commissioned
or communicated without genetics specialists; and
research institutions (university/other public/charitable/
private). The challenge, therefore, may be to establish
standards for those entities facilitating registration,
including the institutions hosting registered users. A
particularly crucial element of the institutional aspect of
access control is the identiﬁcation of accounts that no
longer meet the access criteria. There needs to be well-
deﬁned, well-understood mechanisms for reviewing and
revoking status, and registries of users will need to
demonstrate that they successfully ensure sponsors do so
in a timely manner. Examples of situations which access
control workﬂows may need to account for include staff
moving from one role to another (which may alter the
user’s clinical care professional vs. researcher category)
or leaving the profession.
From a technical point of view, we split the registered
access architecture into two components, which can be
separated organizationally and geographically: a component
that manages the individual’s identity and attributes, and the
party that relies upon this component to conﬁrm identity
and attributes. The OpenID Connect technical standard
(http://openid.net/connect/) refers to these two components
as the “OpenID Provider” and the “relying party” respec-
tively. There may be several registries and relying parties
managed by different organizations in different geo-
graphical locations.
The OpenID Provider is responsible for authenticating a
registered user’s identity and for sharing attributes that the
relying party may use to authorize access (see Box 2 and
Fig. 1). Given OpenID Connect’s broad use worldwide, we
suppose that organizations such as ELIXIR in Europe or
NCBI in the US could deploy the technology needed to
operate as an OpenID Provider for their constituencies.
Registered access relying parties are the entities that
consume OpenID authorizations and enforce access rights
and privileges based on the registered access status and
attributes of the users. To be able to use registered access
claims, a relying party needs to trust one or several OpenID
Providers. In order to establish a federation of OpenID
Providers and relying parties, they need to agree on the
exact semantics of registered access status and attributes;
how credentials are veriﬁed by the OpenID Provider and
expressed to the relying party; what technical protocols are
used to share between the registry and the relying party; and
how to protect the conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability
of the communication.
User attributes and attestations are provided to relying
parties through the standardized OpenID Connect protocol,
which is based on OAuth 2.0 [33]. These standards provide
a mechanism through which OpenID Providers may
authenticate users and provide “claims”—data structures
that encode various user attributes—that can be crypto-
graphically validated by relying parties and used in med-
iating access to data. Once identity has been authenticated
and registered access attributes shared, OAuth 2.0 will
mediate the requested access based on the data holder’s
access policy.
The GA4GH is working to deﬁne a set of custom claims
for registered access that all OpenID Providers and relying
parties can adopt (Library Cards [34]) providing interoper-
ability across the ecosystem of registered access adopters.
Strong identity-prooﬁng will be required within a uniﬁed
identity framework, especially in the future, for registration
that is independent of institutional listing or peer vouching.
We plan to use existing guidelines [35] for how to establish
and maintain trust in digital identities. These frameworks
rank a spectrum of assurance levels, and relying parties
can report (in claims) which of these levels was used to
perform identity prooﬁng.
Researcher attributes and registered access status count
as personal, identiﬁable information, which is protected by
privacy laws, including the new GDPR in the EU. To
protect the privacy of researchers and respect data protec-
tion laws, it is proposed that OpenID Providers limit the
amount of personal data shared with relying parties. This
would mean communicating only a pseudonymous identi-
ﬁer of the researcher (i.e., an alphanumeric code, which is
needed for thwarting re-identiﬁcation and other attacks on
multiple relying parties simultaneously) and their registered
access status (which is needed for verifying the requestor’s
status), including its route and provenance, i.e., which
registry delivered the status. Consent is one of the six lawful
bases to process personal information in the GDPR [36].
Article 4(11) deﬁnes consent as: “any freely given, speciﬁc,
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informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s
wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear
afﬁrmative action, signiﬁes agreement to the processing of
personal data relating to him or her”. For the registration
process, this would entail providing users with a way to
consent to the sharing of their personal data for the purposes
of gaining registered status, which ELIXIR has integrated
into its pilot system.
Different datasets, even within an institution, may have
different requirements, such as the Consent Codes asso-
ciated with data. Such datasets may require additional
Attestation statements, beyond those recommended by
GA4GH, for access (see Fig. 1); a data steward [37]
(or the data custodian or guardian as referred to in different
locations) must specify and enable such Attestations, and
they will usually be guided by research ethics committees
and institutional review boards in these responsibilities.
While access conditions must reﬂect the use permissions
of the dataset, additional Attestations/restrictions may
complicate or prevent the aggregation of data from many
sources.
Accessibility
In the interests of efﬁciency and alleviating administrative
burden on data custodians—particularly given the number
of potential registered users—efforts should be made to
automate the registered access process. Additionally, from
an information security perspective, self-asserted attributes
provide little accountability and raise the possibility of
identity theft. We therefore sought to incorporate automated
(or delegated, e.g., institutional) checks of user attributes.
As our plans for the processing of registered access attri-
butes for bona ﬁde researcher registration draw on pre-
existing academic infrastructure, we envisage minimal
investment from an institutional perspective, reducing bar-
riers to adoption of this system. It will be important to
install a comparable system for access by researchers in
industry.
Since 2005, research and education institutions have
been operating technical frameworks called identity fed-
erations that allow researchers to use their home institu-
tion’s credentials (such as user accounts and passwords) to
access services that are outside their home institutions. To
register their bona ﬁde researcher status and make the
related attestations within such federations, a researcher
would ﬁrst need to log in at their home institution, which
then delivers their fresh and validated role and afﬁliation
information to the registration process. Currently, there is
some form of national research and education identity
federation in 72 countries (https://refeds.org/federations)
using many different systems but usually the same
technology and that are bridged with a system called edu-
GAIN (https://www.edugain.org; a sister service of
eduroam, https://www.eduroam.org/). A beneﬁt of using
an identity federation for registered access is that the
researcher status is not self-asserted by the researcher
but instead claimed by the research institution employing
the researcher. The home institution is also able to provide
more ﬁne-grained information on the person’s afﬁliation
(http://software.internet2.edu/eduperson/internet2-mace-dir-
eduperson-201602.html#eduPersonAfﬁliation) than a sim-
ple institutional e-mail address check, which often does
not differentiate between researchers, students, and
administrative staff. Additional details that could support
registered access through federated identity management
would be the categorization of bio/health researchers or
even “registered following GA4GH standards.” A challenge
of identity federation is that currently there is no widely
deployed framework for the level of assurance of the
identity and authentication of users. Data protection laws
also make some institutions hesitate to release researchers’
personal data to other jurisdictions. Collaborations such
as the Federated Identity Management for Research Colla-
boration (FIM4R) aim to establish common standards that
meet the needs of various research communities [38, 39].
Conclusion
While there remain many challenges in implementing
registered access, especially at scale and with respect to the
legal and administrative tools to facilitate registration
through the proposed range of routes, the GA4GH pilots
have allowed us to ﬂesh out various aspects and better
understand its practical utility. The main goal of registered
access is to streamline access to datasets that require
acceptance of terms and conditions due to consent agree-
ments or because of a level of ethical and legal risk, and
to enable access to multiple datasets at once as well as
to facilitate data discovery and use. We also envisage
that the simplicity, and clarity, of the standard conditions
of data access and use in registered access (the attestation)
will both encourage greater use of the data and respect for
its ethical use, as seen with licensing terms, such as GNU
General Public License and Creative Commons.
The registered access model and services described
above must correctly maintain protections that were
agreed to by study participants as well as researchers
and clinicians who wish to study their data in order to
eventually advance biomedical knowledge and beneﬁt
society. The registered access policy model will then
need to be recognized and supported by many stakeholders,
including research ethics boards, such that the language
used in consent forms and research agreements are
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compatible with this access model. This will make a big
difference in how “silo-ed” data continue to be. Ultimately,
the conﬁdence the research community will gain in the
system will determine the extent of the resources it will
ultimately provide.
Finally, while we have focused initially on registration
criteria for researchers and clinical care professionals,
many of whom have not generally had access through the
controlled access system, we anticipate that data users
will eventually include members of the public, including
patients and citizen scientists (see e.g., mPower [40]), as
well as other groups such as volunteer health-care providers
and journalists. We plan to consider expanding registered
access for these important and diverse groups in the near
future, within the permissions of consent, and ethical stan-
dards, and with broad consultation with patient advocacy
groups and research participants.
Another important aspect of improving data access is
the development of ethics tools to support the assessment
of data sensitivity and therefore the risk in data sharing
to better determine proportionate levels of protection
(e.g., open or registered). A coherent approach involves
considering both the risk of re-identiﬁcation of data
and its sensitivity, along with the data sharing expectations
of individuals and communities (Data Sharing Privacy
Test [41]).
We expect registered access will inform and may even
replace many controlled access mechanisms as the level
of accountability that it can achieve is demonstrated over
time. Data Access Committees may come to play new
roles, such as deciding which data are suited to registered
access, as well as reviewing applications of atypical
potential users and handling other aspects of data govern-
ance (e.g., data use breaches or retractions).
We believe that it is ethically desirable to use less
restrictive access controls, wherever suitable, to increase the
chances of having the best research from the most people
using the data that has been contributed. To needlessly
reduce appropriate access likely undermines the intentions
and desires of research participants as well as hindering the
course of research progress.
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